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We study multiplayer turn-based games played on a finite directed graph such that each player aims
at satisfying an ω-regular Boolean objective. Instead of the well-known notions of Nash equilibrium
(NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), we focus on the recent notion of weak subgame per-
fect equilibrium (weak SPE), a refinement of SPE. In this setting, players who deviate can only use
the subclass of strategies that differ from the original one on a finite number of histories. We are
interested in the constrained existence problem for weak SPEs. We provide a complete characteriza-
tion of the computational complexity of this problem: it is P-complete for Explicit Muller objectives,
NP-complete for Co-Bu¨chi, Parity, Muller, Rabin, and Streett objectives, and PSPACE-complete for
Reachability and Safety objectives (we only prove NP-membership for Bu¨chi objectives). We also
show that the constrained existence problem is fixed parameter tractable and is polynomial when the
number of players is fixed. All these results are based on a fine analysis of a fixpoint algorithm that
computes the set of possible payoff profiles underlying weak SPEs.
1 Introduction
Two-player zero-sum graph games with ω-regular objectives are the classical mathematical model to
formalize the reactive synthesis problem [28, 29]. More recently, generalization from zero-sum to non
zero-sum, and from two players to n players have been considered in the literature, see e.g. [2, 4, 5, 6,
11, 13, 18, 25, 31] and the surveys [9, 22]. Those extensions are motivated by two main limitations
of the classical setting. First, zero-sum games assume a fully antagonistic environment while this is
often not the case in practice: the environment usually has its own goal. While the fully antagonistic
assumption is simple and sound (a winning strategy against an antagonistic environment is winning
against any environment that pursues its own objective), it may fail to find a winning strategy even if
solutions exist when the objective of the environment is accounted. Second, modern reactive systems are
often composed of several modules, and each module has its own specification and should be considered
as a player on its own right. This is why we need to consider n-player graph games.
For n-player graph games, solution concepts like Nash equilibria (NEs) [26] are natural to consider.
A strategy profile is an NE if no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from his strategy, i.e.
no player can strictly improve on the outcome of the strategy profile by changing his strategy only. In
∗This article is based upon work from COST Action GAMENET CA 16228 supported by COST (European Cooperation in
Science and Technology).
†Author supported by ERC Starting Grant (279499: inVEST).
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2 Constrained existence problem for weak subgame perfect equilibria withω-regular Boolean objectives
the context of sequential games (such as games played on graphs), NEs allow for non-credible threats
that rational players should not carry out. To avoid non-credible threats, refinements such as subgame
perfect equilibria (SPEs) [27] have been advocated. A strategy profile is an SPE if it is an NE in all the
subgames of the original game. So players need to play rationally in all subgames, and this ensures that
non-credible threats cannot exist. For applications of this concept to n-player graph games, we refer the
reader to [7, 13, 31].
In [8], the notion of weak subgame perfect equilibrium (weak SPE) is introduced, and it is shown
how it can be used to study the existence SPEs (possibly with contraints) in quantitative reachability
games. While an SPE must be resistant to any unilateral deviation of one player, a weak SPE must be
resistant to deviations restricted to deviating strategies that differ from the original one on a finite number
of histories only. In [12] the authors study general conditions on the structure of the game graph and on
the preference relations of the players that guarantee the existence of a weak SPE for quantitative games.
Weak SPEs retain most of the important properties of SPEs and they coincide with them when the payoff
function of each player is continuous (see e.g. [20]). Weak SPEs are also easier to characterize and to
manipulate algorithmically. We refer the interested reader to [8, 12] for further justifications of their
interest, as well as for related work on NEs and SPEs.
Main contributions In this paper, we concentrate on graph games with ω-regular Boolean objectives.
While SPEs, and thus weak SPEs, are always guaranteed to exist in such games, we here study the
computational complexity of the constrained existence problem for weak SPEs, i.e. equilibria in which
some designated players have to win and some other ones have to loose. More precisely, our main results
are as follows:
• We study the constrained existence problem for games with Reachability, Safety, Bu¨chi, Co-Bu¨chi,
Parity, Explicit Muller, Muller, Rabin, and Streett objectives. We provide a complete characteri-
zation of the computational complexity of this problem for all the classes of objectives with one
exception: Bu¨chi objectives. The problem is P-complete for Explicit Muller objectives, it is NP-
complete for Co-Bu¨chi, Parity, Muller, Rabin, and Streett objectives, and it is PSPACE-complete
for Reachability and Safety objectives. In case of Bu¨chi objectives, we show membership to NP
but we fail to prove hardness.
• Our complexity results rely on the identification of a symbolic witness for the constrained ex-
istence of a weak SPE, the size of which allows us to prove NP/PSPACE-membership. As the
constrained existence problem is PSPACE-complete for Reachability and Safety objectives, sym-
bolic witnesses as compact as those for the other objectives cannot exist unless NP = PSPACE.
The identification of symbolic witnesses is obtained thanks to a fixpoint algorithm that computes
the set of all possible payoff profiles underlying weak SPEs.
• When the number of players is fixed, we show that the constrained existence problem can be
solved in polynomial time for all ω-regular objectives. We also prove that it is fixed parameter
tractable where the parameter is the number of players, for Reachability, Safety, Bu¨chi, Co-Bu¨chi,
and Parity objectives. For Rabin, Streett, and Muller objectives, we still establish fixed parame-
ter tractability but we need to consider some additional parameters depending on the objectives.
These tractability results are obtained by a fine analysis of the complexity of the fixpoint algorithm
mentioned previously.
Related work and additional contributions In [22, 31], a tree automata-based algorithm is given to
decide the constrained existence problem for SPEs on graph games with ω-regular objectives defined
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by parity conditions. A complexity gap is left open: this algorithm executes in EXPTIME and NP-
hardness of the decision problem is proved. In this paper, we focus on weak SPEs for which we provide
precise complexity results for the constrained existence problem. We also observe that our results on
Reachabilty and Safety objectives transfer from weak SPEs to SPEs: the constrained existence problem
for SPEs is PSPACE-complete for those objectives. Quantitative Reachability objectives are investigated
in [8] where it is proved that the constrained existence problem for weak SPEs and SPEs is decidable,
but its exact complexity is left open.
In [8, 12, 19], the existence of (weak) SPEs in graph games is established using a construction based
on a fixpoint. Our fixpoint algorithm is mainly inspired by the fixpoint technique of [12]. However, we
provide complexity results based on this fixpoint while transfinite induction is used in [12]. Furthermore,
we have modified the technique of [12] in a way to get a fixpoint that contains exactly all the possible
payoff profiles of weak SPEs. This is necessary to get a decision algorithm for the constrained existence
problem.
Profiles of strategies with finite-memory are more appealing from a practical point of view. It is
shown in [31] that when there exists an SPE in a graph game with ω-regular objectives, then there exists
one that uses finite-memory strategies and has the same payoff profile. Thanks to the symbolic witnesses,
we have refined those results for weak SPEs.
Structure of the paper In Section 2, we recall the notions of n-player graph games and of (weak) SPE,
and we state the studied constrained existence problem. In Section 3, we provide a fixpoint algorithm that
computes all the possible payoff profiles for weak SPEs on a given graph game. From this fixpoint, we
derive symbolic witnesses of weak SPEs. In Section 4, we study the complexity classes of the constrained
existence problem for all objectives except Explicit Muller objectives. In Section 5, we prove the fixed
parameter tractability of the constrained existence problem and we show that is in polynomial time when
the number of players is fixed. We also show that this problem it is P-complete for Explicit Muller
objectives. In Section 6, we give a conclusion and propose future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce multiplayer graph games in which each player aims to achieve his Boolean
objective. We focus on classical ω-regular objectives, like Reachability, Bu¨chi, aso. We recall two
classical concepts of equilibria: Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium (see [22]). We also
recall weak variants of these equilibria as proposed in [8, 12]. We conclude the section by the constrained
existence problem that is studied in this paper.
2.1 Multiplayer Boolean games
Definition 1 (Boolean game). A multiplayer Boolean game is a tuple G = (Π,V,(Vi)i∈Π,E,(Gaini)i∈Π)
where
• Π= {1,2, . . . ,n} is a finite set of n players;
• G = (V,E) is a finite directed graph and for all v ∈V there exists v′ ∈V such that (v,v′) ∈ E;
• (Vi)i∈Π is a partition of V between the players;
• Gain = (Gaini)i∈Π is a tuple of functions Gaini : Vω →{0,1} that assigns a Boolean value to each
infinite path of G for player i.
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A play in G is an infinite sequence of vertices ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . such that for all k ∈ N, (ρk,ρk+1) ∈ E. A
history is a finite sequence h = h0h1 . . .hn (n ∈ N) defined similarly. We denote the set of plays by Plays
and the set of histories by Hist. Moreover, the set Histi is the set of histories such that the last vertex v is
a vertex of player i, i.e. v ∈Vi. The length |h| of h is the number n of its edges. A play ρ is called a lasso
if it is of the form ρ = h`ω with h` ∈ Hist. Notice that ` is not necessary a simple cycle. The length of
a lasso h`ω is the length of h`. For all h ∈ Hist, we denote by First(h) the first vertex h0 of h. We use
notation h < ρ when a history h is prefix of a play (or a history) ρ . Given a play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . ., the set
Occ(ρ) = {v∈V | ∃k,ρk = v} is the set of vertices visited by ρ , and Inf(ρ) = {v∈V | ∀k,∃ j≥ k,ρ j = v}
is the set of vertices infinitely often visited by ρ . Given a vertex v ∈V , Succ(v) = {v′ | (v,v′) ∈ E} is the
set of successors of v, and Succ∗(v) is the set of vertices reachable from v in G.
When an initial vertex v0 ∈V is fixed, we call (G ,v0) an initialized game. A play (resp. a history) of
(G ,v0) is a play (resp. a history) of G starting in v0. The set of such plays (resp. histories) is denoted by
Plays(v0) (resp. Hist(v0)). We also use notation Histi(v0) when these histories end in a vertex v ∈Vi.
The goal of each player i is to achieve his objective, i.e., to maximize his gain.
Definition 2 (Objective). For each player i ∈ Π, let Obji ⊆ Vω be his objective. In the setting of multi-
player Boolean game, the gain function Gaini is defined such that Gaini(ρ) = 1 (resp. Gaini(ρ) = 0) if
and only if ρ ∈ Obji (resp. ρ 6∈ Obji).
An objective Obji (or the related gain function Gaini) is prefix-independent if for all h ∈ V ∗ and
ρ ∈ Vω , we have ρ ∈ Obji if and only if hρ ∈ Obji. In this paper, we focus on classical ω-regular
objectives: Reachability, Safety, Bu¨chi, Co-Bu¨chi, Parity, Explicit Muller, Muller, Rabin, and Streett and
we suppose that each player has the same type of objective. For instance, we say that G is a Boolean
game with Bu¨chi objectives to express that all players have a Bu¨chi objective.
Definition 3 (Classical ω-regular objective). The set Obji is a Reachability, Safety, Bu¨chi, Co-Bu¨chi,
Parity, Explicit Muller, Muller, Rabin, or Streett objective for player i if and only if Obji is composed of
the plays ρ satisfying:
• Reachability: given F ⊆V , Occ(ρ)∩F 6= /0;
• Safety: given F ⊆V , Occ(ρ)∩F = /0;
• Bu¨chi: given F ⊆V , Inf(ρ)∩F 6= /0;
• Co-Bu¨chi: given F ⊆V , Inf(ρ)∩F = /0;
• Parity: given a coloring function Ω : V →{1, . . . ,d}, max(Inf(Ω(ρ)))1 is even;
• Explicit Muller: givenF ⊆ 2V , Inf(ρ) ∈F ;
• Muller: given a coloring function Ω : V →{1, . . . ,d}, andF ⊆ 2Ω(V ), Inf(Ω(ρ)) ∈F ;
• Rabin: given (G j,R j)1≤ j≤k a family of pair of sets G j,R j ⊆V ,
there exists j ∈ 1, . . . ,k such that Inf(ρ)∩G j 6= /0 and Inf(ρ)∩R j = /0;
• Streett: given (G j,R j)1≤ j≤k a family of pair of sets G j,R j ⊆V ,
for all j ∈ 1, . . . ,k, Inf(ρ)∩G j = /0 or Inf(ρ)∩R j 6= /0.
All these objectives are prefix-independent except Reachability and Safety objectives.
A strategy of a player i ∈ Π is a function σi : Histi → V . This function assigns to each history hv
with v ∈ Vi, a vertex v′ such that (v,v′) ∈ E. In an initialized game (G ,v0), σi needs only to be defined
for histories starting in v0. A play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . is consistent with σi if for all ρk ∈ Vi we have that
1Where Ω(ρ) =Ω(ρ0)Ω(ρ1) . . .Ω(ρn) . . ..
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Figure 1: Example of a Boolean game with Bu¨chi objectives
σi(ρ0 . . .ρk) = ρk+1. A strategy σi is positional if it only depends on the last vertex of the history, i.e.,
σi(hv) = σi(v) for all hv ∈ Histi. It is finite-memory if it can be encoded by a deterministic Moore
machine M = (M,m0,αu,αn) where M is a finite set of states (the memory of the strategy), m0 ∈ M
is the initial memory state, αu : M×V → M is the update function, and αn : M×Vi → V is the next-
action function. The Moore machineM defines a strategy σi such that σi(hv) = αn(α̂u(m0,h),v) for all
histories hv ∈ Histi, where α̂u extends αu to histories as expected. The size of the strategy σi is the size
|M| of its machineM . Note that σi is positional when |M|= 1.
A strategy profile is a tuple σ = (σi)i∈Π of strategies, one for each player. It is called positional (resp.
finite-memory) if for all i ∈ Π, σi is positional (resp. finite-memory). Given an initialized game (G ,v0)
and a strategy profile σ , there exists an unique play from v0 consistent with each strategy σi. We call this
play the outcome of σ and it is denoted by 〈σ〉v0 . Let p = (pi)i∈Π ∈ {0,1}Π, we say that σ is a strategy
profile with payoff p or that 〈σ〉v0 has payoff p if pi = Gaini(〈σ〉v0) for all i ∈Π.
2.2 Solution concepts
In the multiplayer game setting, the solution concepts usually studied are equilibria (see [22]). We here
recall the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium, as well as some variants. We
begin with the notion of deviating strategy.
Let σ = (σi)i∈Π be a strategy profile in an initialized Boolean game (G ,v0). Given i ∈Π, a strategy
σ ′i 6= σi is a deviating strategy of player i, and (σ ′i ,σ−i) denotes the strategy profile σ where σ ′i replaces
σi. Such a strategy is a profitable deviation for player i if Gaini(〈σ〉v0) < Gaini(〈σ ′i ,σ−i〉v0). We say
that σ ′i is finitely deviating from σi if σ ′i and σi only differ on a finite number of histories, and that σ ′i is
one-shot deviating from σi if σ ′i and σi only differ on v0 [8, 12].
The notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) is classical: a strategy profile σ in an initialized game (G ,v0)
is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from his strategy since he
has no profitable deviation, i.e., for each i ∈ Π and each deviating strategy σ ′i of player i from σi, the
following inequality holds: Gaini(〈σ〉v0)≥ Gaini(〈σ ′i ,σ−i〉v0). In this paper we focus on two variants of
NE: weak/very weak NE [8, 12].
Definition 4 (Weak/very weak Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile σ is a weak NE (resp. very weak
NE) in (G ,v0) if, for each player i ∈Π, for each finitely deviating (resp. one-shot) strategy σ ′i of player i
from σi, we have Gaini(〈σ〉v0)≥ Gaini(〈σ ′i ,σ−i〉v0).
Example 5. Figure 1 illustrates an initialized Boolean game (G ,v0) with Bu¨chi objectives in which there
exists a weak NE that is not an NE. In this game, player 1 (resp. player 2) owns round (resp. square)
vertices and wants to visits v1 (resp. v3 or v5) infinitely often. The positional strategy profile σ = (σ1,σ2)
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is depicted by dashed arrows, its outcome is equal to 〈σ〉v0 = v0v1v2vω3 , and σ has payoff (0,1). Notice
that player 1 has an incentive to deviate from his strategy σ1 with a strategy σ ′1 that goes to v1 for all
histories ending in v2. This is indeed a profitable deviation for him since Gain(〈(σ ′1,σ2)〉v0) = (1,0). So,
σ is not an NE. Nevertheless, it is a weak NE because σ ′1 is the only profitable deviation and it is not
finitely deviating (it differs from σ1 on all histories of the form v0(v1v2)k for k ∈ N\{0}).
When considering games played on graphs, a well-known refinement of NE is the concept of sub-
game perfect equilibrium (SPE) which a strategy profile being an NE in each subgame. Variants of
weak/very weak SPE can also be studied as done with NEs. Formally, given an initialized Boolean game
(G ,v0) and a history hv ∈Hist(v0), the initialized game (Gh,v) is called a subgame2 of (G ,v0) such that
Gh = (Π,V,(Vi)i∈Π,E,Gainh) and Gainih(ρ) = Gaini(hρ) for all i ∈ Π and ρ ∈ Vω . Moreover if σi
is a strategy for player i in (G ,v0), then σih denotes the strategy in (Gh,v) such that for all histories
h′ ∈ Histi(v), σih(h′) = σi(hh′). Similarly, from a strategy profile σ in (G ,v0), we derive the strategy
profile σh in (Gh,v). The play 〈σh〉v is called a subgame outcome of σ .
Definition 6 (Subgame perfect equilibrium and weak/very weak subgame perfect equilibrium). A strat-
egy profile σ is a (resp. weak, very weak) subgame perfect equilibrium in (G ,v0) if for all hv ∈Hist(v0),
σh is a (resp. weak, very weak) NE in (Gh,v).
When one needs to show that a strategy profile is a weak SPE, the next proposition is very useful
because it states that it is enough to consider one-shot deviating strategies.
Proposition 7 ([8]). A strategy profile σ is a weak SPE if and only if σ is a very weak SPE.
Example 8. In Example 5 is given a weak NE σ in the game (G ,v0) depicted in Figure 1. This strategy
profile is also a very weak SPE (and thus a weak SPE by Proposition 7). For instance, in the subgame
(Gh,v) with h = v0v1 and v = v2, the only one-shot deviating strategy σ ′1 is such that σ ′1 coincides with
σ1h except that σ ′1(v2) = v1. This is not a profitable deviation for player 1 in (Gh,v). Notice that σ is
not an SPE since it is not an NE as explained in Example 5.
In general, the notions of SPE and weak SPE are not equivalent (see Example 8). Nevertheless they
coincide for the class of Boolean games with Reachability objectives.
Proposition 9. Let σ be a strategy profile in an initialized Boolean game (G ,v0) with Reachability
objectives. Then σ is an SPE if and only if σ is a weak SPE.
Proof. Each player i has a Reachability objective, let Fi be the set of vertices he aims to visit.
(⇒) This implication is a consequence of the definitions of SPE and weak SPE.
(⇐) Let σ be a weak SPE in (G ,v0). Assume that σ is not an SPE, i.e., there exists hv ∈ Hist(v0)
such that σh is not an NE in (Gh,v). Then some player i has a profitable deviation σ ′i in the subgame
(Gh,v). As Gaini takes its values in {0,1}, this means that
0 = Gaini(hρ)< Gaini(hρ ′) = 1
with ρ = 〈σh〉v and ρ ′ = 〈σ ′i ,σ−ih〉v. We consider the first occurrence of a vertex of Fi along hρ ′ (which
appears in ρ ′ and not in h as Gaini(hρ) = 0): let g′ of mininal length such that hg′ < hρ ′ and g′ ends in
some v′ ∈ Fi. Let us define a strategy τi that is finitely deviating from σih and profitable for player i in
(Gh,v). This will be in contradiction with our hypothesis. For all g ∈ Histi(v), let
τi(g) =
{
σ ′i (g) if g≤ g′
σih(g) otherwise
.
By definition of τi, we have that Gaini(h〈τi,σ−ih〉v) = Gaini(hρ ′) = 1 and τi is finitely deviating from
σih since |g′| is finite.
2Notice that (G ,v0) is subgame of itself.
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2.3 Constraint problem
It is proved in [12] that there always exists a weak SPE in Boolean games. In this paper, we are interested
in solving the following constraint problem:
Definition 10 (Constraint problem). Given (G ,v0) an initialized Boolean game and thresholds x,y ∈
{0,1}|Π|, decide whether there exists a weak SPE in (G ,v0) with payoff p such that x≤ p≤ y.3
In the next sections, we solve the constraint problem for the classical ω-regular objectives. The
complexity classes that we obtain are shown in Table 1. They are detailed in Section 4 with the case of
Explicit Muller objectives postponed to Section 5.3. The case of Bu¨chi objectives remains open, since
we only propose a non-deterministic algorithm in polynomial time but no matching lower bound. In
Section 5, we prove that the constraint problem for weak SPEs is fixed parameter tractable and becomes
polynomial when the number of players is fixed. All these results are based on a characterization of the
set of possible payoffs of a weak SPE, that is described in Section 3.
Table 1: Complexity classes of the constraint problem for ω-regular objectives
Explicit Muller Co-Bu¨chi Parity Muller Rabin Streett Reachability Safety
P-complete ×
NP-complete × × × × ×
PSPACE-complete × ×
3 Characterization
In this section our aim is twofold: first, we characterize the set of possible payoffs of weak SPEs and sec-
ond, we show how it is possible to build a weak SPE given a set of lassoes with some “good properties”.
Those characterizations work for Boolean games with prefix-independent gain functions. We make this
hypothesis all along Section 3.
3.1 Remove-Adjust procedure
Let (G ,v0) be an initialized Boolean game with prefix-independent gain functions. The computation of
the set of all the payoffs of weak SPEs in (G ,v0) is inspired by a fixpoint procedure explained in [12].
Each vertex v is labeled by a set of payoffs p∈ {0,1}|Π|. Initially, these payoffs are those for which there
exists a play in Plays(v) with payoff p. Then step by step, some payoffs are removed for the labeling
of v as soon as we are sure they cannot be the payoff of σh in a subgame (Gh,v) for some weak SPE
σ .4 When a fixpoint is reached, the labeling of the initial vertex v0 exactly contains all the payoffs of
weak SPEs in (G ,v0). Hence, at each step of this procedure, the payoffs labeling a vertex v are payoffs
of potential subgame outcomes of a weak SPE. Their number decreases until reaching a fixpoint.
We formally proceed as follows. For all v ∈V , we define the initial labeling of v as:
P0(v) = {p ∈ {0,1}|Π| | there exists ρ ∈ Plays(v) such that Gain(ρ) = p}.
3The order ≤ is the componentwise order, that is, xi ≤ pi ≤ yi, for all i ∈Π.
4The value of h is not important since the gain functions are prefix independent. This is why we only focus on v and not
on hv.
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Then for each step k ∈ N \ {0}, we compute the set Pk(v) by alternating between two operations:
Remove and Adjust. To this end, we need to introduce the notion of (p,k)-labeled play. Let p be a payoff
and k be a step, a play ρ = ρ0ρ1ρ2 . . . is (p,k)-labeled if for all j ∈N we have p∈ Pk(ρ j), that is, ρ visits
only vertices that are labeled by p at step k. We first give the definition of the Remove-Adjust procedure
and then give some intuition about it.
Definition 11 (Remove-Adjust procedure). Let k ∈ N\{0}.
• If k is odd, process the Remove operation:
– If for some v ∈ Vi there exists p ∈ Pk−1(v) and v′ ∈ Succ(v) such that pi < p′i for all p′ ∈
Pk−1(v′), then Pk(v) = Pk−1(v)\{p} and for all u 6= v, Pk(u) = Pk−1(u).
– If such a vertex v does not exist, then Pk(u) = Pk−1(u) for all u ∈V .
• If k is even, process the Adjust operation:
– If some payoff p was removed from Pk−2(v) (that is, Pk−1(v) = Pk−2(v)\{p}), then
∗ For all u ∈V such that p ∈ Pk−1(u), check whether there still exists a (p,k−1)-labeled
play with payoff p from u. If it is the case, then Pk(u) = Pk−1(u), otherwise Pk(u) =
Pk−1(u)\{p}.
∗ For all u ∈V such that p /∈ Pk−1(u): Pk(u) = Pk−1(u).
– Otherwise Pk(u) = Pk−1(u) for all u ∈V .
Let us explain the Remove operation. Let p that labels vertex v. This means that it is the payoff of a
potential subgame outcome of a weak SPE that starts in v. Suppose that v is a vertex of player i and v has
a successor v′ such that pi < p′i for all p
′ labeling v′. Then p cannot be the payoff of σh in the subgame
(Gh,v) for some weak SPE σ and some history h, otherwise player i would have a profitable (one-shot)
deviation by moving from v to v′ in this subgame.
Now it may happen that for another vertex u having p in its labeling, all potential subgame outcomes
of a weak SPE from u with payoff p necessarily visit vertex v. As p has been removed from the labeling
of v, these potential plays do no longer survive and p is also removed from the labeling of u by the Adjust
operation.
We can state the existence of a fixpoint of the sequences (Pk(v))k∈N, v∈V , in the following meaning:
Proposition 12 (Existence of a fixpoint). There exists an even natural number k∗ ∈ N such that for all
v ∈V , Pk∗(v) = Pk∗+1(v) = Pk∗+2(v).
Proof. For all v ∈ V , the sequence (Pk(v))k∈N is nonincreasing because the Remove and Ajdust oper-
ations never add a new payoff. As each P0(v) is finite (it contains at most 2|Π| payoffs), there exists a
natural odd number k∗+1 such that for all v ∈ V , Pk∗(v) = Pk∗+1(v) during the Remove operation, and
thus for all v ∈V , Pk∗+1(v) = Pk∗+2(v) during the Adjust operation.
Example 13. We illustrate the different steps of the Remove-Adjust procedure on the example depicted
in Figure 1, and we display the result of this computation in Table 2. Initially, the sets P0(v), v ∈ V ,
contains all payoffs p such that there exists a play ρ ∈ Plays(v) with Gain(ρ) = p. At step k = 1, we
apply a Remove operation to v = v4 (this is the only possible v): v is a vertex of player i = 2 and v has
a successor v′ = v5 such that (0,1) ∈ P0(v5). Therefore (0,0) is removed from P0(v4) to get P1(v4). By
definition of the Remove operation, the other sets P0(u) are not modified and are thus equal to P1(u). At
step k = 2, we apply an Adjust operation. The only way to obtain the payoff (0,0) from v0 is by visiting
v4 with the play v0v4vω6 . As there does not exist a ((0,0),1)-labeled play with payoff (0,0) anymore, we
have to remove (0,0) from P1(v0). The other sets P1(v) remain unchanged. At step k = 3, the Remove
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operation removes payoff (1,0) from P2(v0) due to the unique payoff (0,1) in P2(v4). At step k = 4, the
Adjust operation leaves all sets P3(v) unchanged. Finally at step k = 5, the Remove operation also leaves
all sets P4(v) unchanged, and the fixpoint is reached.
Table 2: Computation of the fixpoint on the example of Figure 1
v0 v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
P0(v) {(0,0),(1,0),(0,1)} {(1,0),(0,1)} {(1,0),(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,0),(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,0)}
P1(v) {(0,0),(1,0),(0,1)} {(1,0),(0,1)} {(1,0),(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,0)}
P2(v) {(1,0),(0,1)} {(1,0),(0,1)} {(1,0),(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,0)}
P3(v) {(0,1)} {(1,0),(0,1)} {(1,0),(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,0)}
P4(v) = Pk∗(v) {(0,1)} {(1,0),(0,1)} {(1,0),(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,1)} {(0,0)}
3.2 Characterization and good symbolic witness
The fixpoint Pk∗(v), v ∈ V , provides a characterization of the payoffs of all weak SPEs as described in
the following theorem. This result is in the spirit of the classical Folk Theorem which characterizes the
payoffs of all NEs in infinitely repeated games (see for instance [20, Chapter 8]).
Theorem 14 (Characterization). Let (G ,v0) be an initialized Boolean game with prefix-independent
gain functions. Then there exists a weak SPE σ with payoff p0 in (G ,v0) if and only if Pk∗(v) 6= /0 for all
v ∈ Succ∗(v0) and p0 ∈ Pk∗(v0).5
In this theorem, only sets Pk∗(v) with v ∈ Succ∗(v0) are considered. Indeed subgames (Gh,v) of
(G ,v0) deals with histories hv ∈ Hist(v0), that is, with vertices v reachable from v0. The rest of this
section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 14.
We begin with a lemma that states that if a payoff p survives at step k in the labeling of v, this means
that there exists a play with payoff p from v that only visits vertices also labeled by p.
Lemma 15. For all even k and in particular for k = k∗, p belongs to Pk(v) if and only if there exists a
(p,k)-labeled play ρ ∈ Plays(v) such that Gain(ρ) = p.
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that there exists a (p,k)-labeled play ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . .∈ Plays(v) such that Gain(ρ)= p.
By definition of a (p,k)-labeled play, we have p ∈ Pk(ρ j) for all j, and so in particular for j = 0.
(⇒) Let us prove that if p belongs to Pk(v), then there exists a (p,k)-labeled play ρ ∈ Plays(v) such
that Gain(ρ) = p. We proceed by induction on k. For k = 0, the assertion is satisfied by definition of
P0(v) and because Gaini is prefix-independent for all i ∈Π.
Suppose that the assertion is true for an even k and let us prove that it remains true for k+ 2. Let
p ∈ Pk+2(v). As Pk+2(v) ⊆ Pk+1(v) ⊆ Pk(v), we have p ∈ Pk(v) and there exists a (p,k)-labeled play
ρ ∈ Plays(v) such that Gain(ρ) = p by induction hypothesis. In other words p ∈ Pk(ρ j) for all j.
We suppose that there exists v′ such that Pk+2(v′) 6= Pk(v′) (the fixpoint is not reached), otherwise
p ∈ Pk+2(ρ j) for all j and ρ is also a (p,k+ 2)-labeled play. Therefore the Remove operation has
removed some payoff p′ from one Pk(v′) and the Adjust operation has possibly removed p′ from some
other Pk(u). If p′ 6= p, then clearly p still belongs to each Pk+2(ρ j) and ρ is again a (p,k+ 2)-labeled
play. If p′ = p, then v′ 6= v since p ∈ Pk+2(v) by hypothesis. Moreover, by the Adjust operation, this
means that there exists a (p,k+1)-labeled play pi = pi0pi1 . . . with payoff p from v which never visits v′.
5We use notation p0 ∈ {0,1}|Π| to highlight that this is the payoff of σ from vertex v0. It should not be confused with any
component pi, i ∈Π, of a payoff p.
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Let us show that pi is also a (p,k+2)-labeled play, that is, p ∈ Pk+2(pi j) for all j. Each suffix pi jpi j+1 . . .
of pi is a (p,k+ 1)-labeled play with payoff p thanks to prefix-independence of Gain. By the Adjust
operation, it follows that Pk+2(pi j) = Pk+1(pi j) for all j. This concludes the proof.
The proof of Theorem 14 uses the concept of (good) symbolic witness defined hereafter. Some
intuition about it is given after the definitions.
Definition 16 (Symbolic witness). Let (G ,v0) be an initialized Boolean game with prefix-independent
gain functions. Let I ⊆ (Π∪{0})×V be the set
I = {(0,v0)} ∪ {(i,v′) | there exists (v,v′) ∈ E such that v,v′ ∈ Succ∗(v0) and v ∈Vi}.
A symbolic witness is a setP = {ρi,v | (i,v)∈ I} such that each ρi,v ∈P is a lasso of G with First(ρi,v) =
v and with length bounded by 2 · |V |2.
A symbolic witness has thus at most |V | · |Π|+1 lassoes (by definition of I) with polynomial length.
Definition 17 (Good symbolic witness). A symbolic witnessP is good if for all ρ j,u, ρi,v′ ∈P , for all
vertices v ∈ ρ j,u such that v ∈Vi and v′ ∈ Succ(v), we have Gaini(ρ j,u)≥ Gaini(ρi,v′).
The condition of Definition 17 is depicted in Figure 2.
u . . . v
∈Vi
v′ . . . . . . ρi,v′
. . . . . . ρ j,u
Figure 2: The condition of Definition 17
Let us now give some intuition. A strategy profile σ in (G ,v0) induces an infinite number of subgame
outcomes 〈σh〉v, hv ∈ Hist(v0). A symbolic witness P is a compact representation of σ . It is a finite
set of lassoes that represent some subgame outcomes of σ : the lasso ρ0,v0 ofP represents the outcome
〈σ〉v0 , and its other lassoes ρi,v′ represents the subgame outcome 〈σh〉v′ for some particular histories
hv′ ∈ Hist(v0). The index i records that player i can move from v (the last vertex of h) to v′ (with the
convention that i = 0 for the outcome 〈σ〉v0). When σ is a weak SPE, the related symbolic witnessP is
good, that is, its lassoes avoid profitable one-shot deviations between them.
Example 18. We come back to our running example. The weak SPE of Example 8 depicted in Figure 1
has payoff p = (0,1). A symbolic witness P of σ is given in Table 3 which is here composed of all
the subgame outcomes of σ . One can check thatP is a good symbolic witness. For instance, consider
its lassoes ρ0,v0 = v0v1v2vω3 and ρ1,v1 = v1v2v
ω
3 , the vertex v2 ∈ V1 of ρ0,v0 and the edge (v2,v1). We
have Gain1(ρ0,v0)≥Gain1(ρ1,v1). Indeed in the subgame (Gv0v1 ,v2), player 1 has no profitable one-shot
deviation by using the edge (v2,v1).
In Proposition 19 below, we are going to prove that there exists a weak SPE if and only if there exists
a good symbolic witness, and that the existence of this witness is equivalent to the non-emptiness of the
fixpoint Pk∗(v), v ∈V . In this way, we will prove Theorem 14. We will see that the lassoes ρi,v of a good
symbolic witness can be constructed from (p,k∗)-labeled plays for well-chosen payoffs p ∈ Pk∗(v).
Proposition 19. Let (G ,v0) be an initialized Boolean game with prefix-independent gain functions. The
following assertions are equivalent:
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Table 3: An example of good symbolic witness
(i,v) (0,v0) (2,v4) (1,v2) (1,v1) (1,v3) (2,v5) (2,v6) (1,v5) (1,v6)
lasso v0v1v2vω3 v4v
ω
5 v2v
ω
3 v1v2v
ω
3 v
ω
3 v
ω
5 v
ω
6 v
ω
5 v
ω
6
payoff (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,1) (0,0) (0,1) (0,0)
1. There exists a weak SPE with payoff p0 in (G ,v0);
2. Pk∗(v) 6= /0 for all v ∈ Succ∗(v0) and p0 ∈ Pk∗(v0);
3. There exists a good symbolic witnessP that contains a lasso ρ0,v0 with payoff p0;
4. There exists a finite-memory weak SPE σ with payoff p0 in (G ,v0) such that the size of each
strategy σi is in O(|V |3 · |Π|).
Proof. We prove that 1⇒ 2⇒ 3⇒ 4⇒ 1.
(1⇒ 2) Suppose that there exists a weak SPE σ with payoff p0 in (G ,v0). To show that Pk∗(v) 6= /0
for all v ∈ Succ∗(v0), let us prove by induction on k that
Gain(〈σh〉v) ∈ Pk(v) for all hv ∈ Hist(v0). (1)
For case k= 0, this is true by definition of P0(v). Suppose that this assertion is satisfied for an even k. Let
us prove that it remains true for k+2 by showing that payoff p = Gain(〈σh〉v) ∈ Pk(v) can be removed
neither from Pk(v) at step k+1, nor from Pk+1(v) at step k+2.
• Payoff p cannot be removed from Pk(v) by the Remove operation at step k+ 1. Otherwise, if
v ∈Vi, this means that there exists v′ ∈ Succ(v) such that
∀p′ ∈ Pk(v′), pi < p′i. (2)
By induction hypothesis,
Gain(〈σhv〉v′) ∈ Pk(v′). (3)
To get a contradiction, we prove that in the subgame (Gh,v) there exists a one-shot deviating
strategy σ ′i from σih that is a profitable deviation for player i. We define σ ′i that only differs
from σih on v: σ ′i (v) = v′. Therefore we get Gain(h〈σ ′i ,σ−ih〉v) = Gain(hv〈σhv〉v′). It follows
by (2), (3), and prefix-independence of Gaini that Gaini(h〈σh〉v) = pi < p′i = Gaini(hv〈σhv〉v′) =
Gain(h〈σ ′i ,σ−ih〉v). This is impossible since σ is a weak SPE.
• Payoff p cannot be removed from Pk+1(v) by the Adjust operation at step k+ 2. Otherwise, this
means that there exists u such that Pk+1(u) = Pk(u)\{p} (by the Remove operation at step k+1)
and there is no (p,k+1)-labeled play with payoff p from v. However by Lemma 15, as p ∈ Pk(v),
there exists a (p,k)-labeled play pi with payoff p from v. This means that pi visit u. Let h′u ∈
Hist(v) such that h′u < pi . Then we get a contradiction with σ being a weak SPE if we repeat
the argument done before in the previous item for u and the subgame (Ghh′ ,u) (instead of v and
(Gh,v)).
Now that we know that Pk∗(v) 6= /0 for all v∈ Succ∗(v0), it remains to prove that p0 ∈ Pk∗(v0). By (1),
we have p0 = Gain(〈σ〉v0) ∈ Pk∗(v0).
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(2⇒ 3) Let us show how to build a good symbolic witnessP from the non-empty fixpoint Pk∗(v),
v ∈ V . First recall that if p ∈ Pk∗(v), then by Lemma 15 there exists a (p,k∗)-labeled play with payoff
p from v. Notice that such a play can be supposed to be a lasso with length at most 2 · |V |2. Indeed
it is proved in [3, Proposition 3.1] that given a play ρ , one can construct a lasso ρ ′ of length bounded
by 2 · |V |2 such that First(ρ) = First(ρ ′), Occ(ρ) = Occ(ρ ′), and Inf(ρ) = Inf(ρ ′) (this construction
eliminates some cycles of ρ in a clever way). Therefore, if ρ is a (p,k∗)-labeled play with payoff p from
v, the lasso ρ ′ is also a (p,k∗)-labeled play with payoff p from v. The required setP will be composed
of some of these lassoes.
We start withP = /0. As p0 ∈ Pk∗(v0), then there exists a (p0,k∗)-labeled lasso ρ0,v0 with payoff p0
from v0 that we add toP . For all v,v′ ∈ Succ∗(v0) such that v ∈Vi and v′ ∈ Succ(v), let p′ be a payoff in
Pk∗(v′) such that
p′i = min{qi | q ∈ Pk∗(v′)}. (4)
This payoff exists since Pk∗(v′) 6= /0 by hypothesis. Then there exists a (p′,k∗)-labeled lasso ρi,v′ with
payoff p′ from v′ that we add toP .
This set P is a symbolic witness by construction. It remains to prove that it is good. Let v ∈ ρ j,u
such that v ∈ Vi and ρ j,u ∈P . As ρ j,u is a (p,k∗)-labeled lasso for some payoff p, we have p ∈ Pk∗(v).
Furthermore, as Pk∗(v) = Pk∗+1(v) (by the fixpoint), this means that p was not removed from Pk∗(v) by
the Remove operation at step k∗. In particular, by definition of the payoff p′ of ρi,v′ (see (4)), we have
pi ≥ p′i, that is Gaini(ρ j,u)≥ Gaini(ρi,v′). This shows thatP is a good symbolic witness.
(3⇒ 4) LetP = {ρi,v | (i,v) ∈ I} be a good symbolic witness that contains a lasso ρ0,v0 with payoff
p0. We define a strategy profile σ step by step by induction on the subgames of (G ,v0). We first partially
build σ such that 〈σ〉v0 = ρ0,v0 . Consider next hvv′ ∈Hist(v0) with v ∈Vi such that 〈σh〉v is already built
but not 〈σhv〉v′ . Then we extend the definition of σ such that
〈σhv〉v′ = ρi,v′ . (5)
Notice that 〈σh〉v being already built means that there exists h′ ≤ h and ( j,u) ∈ I such that
h′〈σh′〉u = h′ρ j,u = h〈σh〉v. (6)
Let us prove that σ is a very weak SPE (and so a weak SPE by Proposition 7). Consider the subgame
(Gh,v) and the one-shot deviating strategy σ ′i from σih such that σ ′i (v) = v′. We have to prove that
Gaini(h〈σh〉v)≥ Gaini(hv〈σhv〉v′). (7)
By (5), (6), and prefix independence of Gaini, we have
Gaini(hv〈σhv〉v′) = Gaini(ρi,v′),
Gaini(h〈σh〉v) = Gaini(ρ j,u).
Inequality (7) follows from these equalities and the fact thatP is a good symbolic witness (see Figure 2).
Notice that σ has payoff p0 by construction (ρ0,v0 has payoff p0). It remains to show that σ is finite-
memory. Having ( j,u) in memory (the last deviating player j and the vertex u where he moved), the
Moore machines Mi, i ∈ Π, representing each strategy σi, have to produce together the lasso ρ j,u of
length bounded by 2 · |V |2. As |P|= |I| ≤ |V | · |Π|+1, the size of each σi is in O(|Π| · |V |3).
(4⇒ 1) This implication is obvious.
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Example 20. We consider again the running example. Thanks to Theorem 14, payoff p0 = (0,1) is
the only possible payoff for a weak SPE in (G ,v0) since Pk∗(v0) = {(0,1)} (see Example 13). Let us
illustrate the constructions of the proof of Proposition 19. We build a good symbolic witness P as
follows. First, we choose a (p0,k∗)-labeled lasso ρ0,v0 with payoff p0 from v0: ρ0,v0 = v0v1v2vω3 (we
could also have chosen v0v4vω5 ). Then let v = v1,v
′ = v2 ∈ Succ∗(v0) such that v ∈V1 and v′ ∈ Succ(v).
As Pk∗(v2) = {(1,0),(0,1)}, by (4), we choose a (p′,k∗)-labeled lasso ρ1,v2 with payoff p′ = (0,1) from
v2, for instance, ρ1,v2 = v2vω3 . The whole setP is depicted in Table 3. FromP , we get the weak SPE of
Example 8 depicted in Figure 1.
Theorem 14 directly follows from Proposition 19. Moreover this proposition highlights a property
that will be very useful in Section 4 (the equivalence between the existence of a weak SPE and the exis-
tence of a good symbolic witness). Finally it shows that when the gain fonctions are prefix-independent,
if there exists a weak SPE with a given payoff, then there always exists one with the same payoff but
with strategies of polynomial size. We prove in Section 4.2.3 that for Reachability and Safety objectives
which are not prefix-independent, we have the same result however with strategies of exponential size.
Corollary 21. Let (G ,v0) be an initialized Boolean game. There exists a weak SPE in (G ,v0) if and only
if there exists a finite-memory weak SPE σ with the same payoff. Moreover, the size of each strategy σi is
• in O(|V |3 · |Π|) for Bu¨chi, Co-Bu¨chi, Parity, Explicit Muller, Muller, Rabin, and Streett objectives,
• in O(|V |3 · |Π| ·23·|Π|) for Reachability and Safety objectives.
4 Complexity classes of the constraint problem
In this section, we study the complexity classes of the constraint problem for Boolean games with clas-
sical ω-regular objectives, except the case of Explicit Muller objectives that is postponed to Section 5.3
(see Table 1). The concept of good symbolic witness is essential in this study.
4.1 NP-completeness
We first prove that the constraint problem for co-Bu¨chi, Parity, Muller, Rabin, and Streett objectives is
NP-complete, and that it is in NP for Bu¨chi objectives.
Theorem 22. The constraint problem for Boolean games with co-Bu¨chi, Parity, Muller, Rabin, and
Streett objectives is NP-complete. It is in NP for Bu¨chi objectives.
Proof. We begin with the NP-easyness. The objectives considered in Theorem 22 are prefix-independent.
We can thus apply Proposition 19. Given thresholds x,y ∈ {0,1}|Π|, there exists a weak SPE in (G ,v0)
with payoff p such that x ≤ p ≤ y if and only if there exists a good symbolic witness P that contains
a lasso ρ0,v0 with payoff p. Hence a nondeterministic polynomial algorithm works as follows: guess a
set P composed of at most |Π| · |V |+ 1 lassoes of length at most 2 · |V |2 and check that P is a good
symbolic witness that contains a lasso ρ0,v0 with payoff p such that x ≤ p ≤ y. Clearly checking that
P is a symbolic witness can be done in polynomial time. Checking that it is good requires to compute
the payoffs of its lassoes and to compare them. This can also be done in polynomial time for Bu¨chi,
co-Bu¨chi, Parity, Muller, Rabin, and Streett objectives.
We now proceed to the NP-hardness. It is obtained thanks to a polynomial reduction from SAT.
In [32] is provided a polynomial reduction from SAT to the constraint problem for NEs in Boolean
games with co-Bu¨chi objectives. Due to the structure of the game constructed in this approach, the same
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reduction holds for the constraint problem for weak SPEs. As co-Bu¨chi objectives can be polynomially
translated into Parity, Muller, Rabin, and Streett objectives (see [21]), the constraint problem for Boolean
games with those objectives is also NP-hard.
4.2 PSPACE-completeness
In this section, we show that the constraint problem for Reachability and Safety objectives is PSPACE-
complete.
Theorem 23. The constraint problem for Boolean games with Reachability and Safety objectives is
PSPACE-complete.
Recall that weak SPEs and SPEs are equivalent notions for Reachability objectives (Proposition 9). It
follows from Theorem 23 that the constraint problem for SPEs (instead of weak SPEs) for Boolean games
with Reachability objectives is PSPACE-complete. We will see later (in Section 4.2.3, from the proof of
Theorem 23) that the constraint problem for SPEs is also PSPACE-complete for Safety objectives.
Corollary 24. The constraint problem for SPEs in Boolean games with Reachability and Safety objec-
tives is PSPACE-complete.
We detail the proof of Theorem 23 in the next two sections for Reachability objectives, and we also
show how to adapt it for Safety objectives. To get the PSPACE-easyness, we transform the Boolean game
(G ,v0) with Reachability objectives (which are not prefix-independent) into a Boolean game (G ′,v′0)
with Bu¨chi objectives. In this way, it is possible to use the concept of good symbolic witness as done
before in Section 4.1. Even if the size of the game (G ′,v′0) is exponential in the size of the initial game
(G ,v0), we manage to get a PSPACE-membership thanks to the classical complexity result PSPACE =
APTIME. The PSPACE-hardness is obtained with a polynomial reduction from QBF. The reduction is
more involved than the one in Theorem 22. Indeed the reduction for NP-hardness already works for NEs
whereas the reduction for PSPACE-hardness really exploits the subgame perfect aspects.
4.2.1 PSPACE-easyness
We here prove that the constraint problem is in PSPACE for Reachability objectives, and we then explain
how to adapt the proof for Safety objectives.
Proposition 25. The constraint problem for Boolean games with Reachability objectives is in PSPACE.
Proof. First, we transform the Boolean game (G ,v0) with Reachability objectives into a Boolean game
(G ′,v′0)with Bu¨chi objectives. This construction is classical, it stores inside the vertices the set of players
who have already satisfied their objective. Suppose that in (G ,v0), each player i aims at reaching a vertex
of Fi, then we build G ′ = (Π,V ′,E ′,(V ′i )i∈Π,(Gain
′
i)i∈Π) such that
• V ′ =V ×2Π;
• ((v, I),(u, I′)) ∈ E ′ if and only if (v,u) ∈ E and I′ = I∪{i ∈Π | v′ ∈ Fi};
• (v, I) ∈V ′i if and only if v ∈Vi;
• Gain′i corresponds to the Bu¨chi objective F ′i = {(v, I) | v ∈V, i ∈ I}; and
• v′0 = (v0, I0) is the initial vertex such that I0 = {i ∈Π | v0 ∈ Fi}.
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Clearly there is a one-to-one correspondence between plays ρ = v1v2 . . .vk . . . in G from v1 and
ρ ′ = (v1, I1)(v2, I2) . . .(vk, Ik) . . . in G ′ from (v1, I1), with the important property that
Ik ⊆ Ik+1 for all k ≥ 1. (8)
In particular, there exists a weak SPE with payoff p0 in (G ,v0) if and only if there is one in (G ′,v′0) if
and only if there is a good symbolic witness P containing a lasso ρ0,v′0 with payoff p0 in (G
′,v′0) (by
Proposition 19).
Second, let us study the lengths of the lassos ρi,v′ , with i ∈ Π∪{0}, v′ ∈ V ′, of P . There exists
a better bound than the bound 2 · |V ′|2 = 2 · |V |2 · 22·|Π| of Definition 16: each lasso ρi,v′ of P has a
polynomial length bounded by
(|Π|+1) · |V |. (9)
Indeed recall that these lassoes are constructed from some (p,k∗)-labeled plays ρ with payoff p from
v′ (see the proof of implication (2⇒ 3) of Proposition 19). We adapt this construction as follows. Let
ρ = (v1, I1)(v2, I2) . . .(vk, Ik) . . . be such a play from v′. By (8), there exists I ⊆ Π and k ∈ N such that
for all k′ ≥ k, Ik′ = I. Hence from ρ , we can construct a lasso ρ ′ of length bounded by (9) such that
First(ρ ′) = First(ρ), Occ(ρ ′)⊆ Occ(ρ), and Gain(ρ ′) = Gain(ρ),
• by eliminating all cycles in the history (v1, I1)(v2, I2) . . .(vk−1, Ik−1) (leading to a history of length
at most |Π| · |V |), and
• by detecting in the play (vk, I)(vk+1, I) . . . the first repeated vertex (vk′ , I) = (vk′+`+1, I) and replac-
ing this play by the lasso (vk, I)(vk+1, I) . . .((vk′ , I) . . .(vk′+`, I))ω of length at most |V |.
In this way, if ρ is a (p,k∗)-labeled play with payoff p from v′, then the constructed lasso ρ ′ is also a
(p,k∗)-labeled play with payoff p from v′.
Third we prove PSPACE-membership of the constraint problem by proving that it is in APTIME.
Given the game (G ′,v′0) and two thresholds x,y ∈ {0,1}|Π|, the alternating Turing machine works as
follows. Existential and universal states (respectively controlled by player ∨ and player ∧) alternate
along an execution of the machine. Player ∨ proposes a lasso ρ j,u′ of length bounded by (|Π|+1) · |V | (in
the initial state, he proposes a lasso ρ0,v′0). Then Player ∧ chooses a vertex w′ ∈V ′i of ρ j,u′ and proposes
to move to v′ such that (w′,v′) ∈ E ′. Player ∨ reacts by proposing a lasso ρi,v′ of length bounded by
(|Π|+1) · |V |, and so on. The execution stops after
2 · |Π|2 · |V |+1 turns. (10)
Such an execution is accepting if:
• for the payoff p0 of the initial lasso ρ0,v′0 , we have x≤ p0 ≤ y;
• for each lasso ρ j,u′ proposed by player ∨, for the corresponding move (w′,v′) ∈ E ′ with w′ ∈ V ′i
made by player ∧, and the answer ρi,v′ of player ∨, we have Gaini(ρ j,u′)≥ Gaini(ρi,v′).
The intuition is that if there exists in (G ′,v′0) a good symbolic witnessP containing a lasso ρ0,v′0 with
payoff p0 such that x≤ p0 ≤ y, then player ∨ will play with the lassoes ofP according to Definition 17.
Notice that along an execution of the Turing machine, player ∧ has no interest to choose twice the same
pair (i,v′) since player ∨ will react with the same lasso ρi,v′ . Remembering property (8), the maximum
number of times that player ∧ has to play is
|Π|2 · |V |. (11)
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Indeed for a fixed I ⊆ Π, player ∧ can choose at most |Π| · |V | different pairs (i,v′) with v′ of the form
(v, I), and the size of I can only increase. This explains the number of turns of any execution of the
machine (see (10)): an initial lasso proposed by player ∨ followed by |Π|2 · |V | alternations between
moves of both players ∨ and ∧.
Checking whether an execution is accepting is done in polynomial time since player ∨ proposes
lassoes of polynomial size by (9), there is a polynomial numbers of turns by (10), and computing and
comparing payoffs of lassoes is done in polynomial time. So the constraint problem is in APTIME =
PSPACE.
The constraint problem for Safety objectives is solved similarly by transforming the given Boolean
game into one with co-Bu¨chi (instead of Bu¨chi) objectives.
Proposition 26. The constraint problem for Boolean games with Safety objectives is in PSPACE.
4.2.2 PSPACE-hardness
We now prove that the constraint problem is PSPACE-hard for Reachability objectives, and we then show
how to adapt the proof for Safety objectives.
Proposition 27. The constraint problem for Boolean games with Reachability objectives is PSPACE-
hard.
To prove this proposition, we give a polynomial reduction from the QBF problem that is PSPACE-
complete. This problem is to decide whether a fully quantified Boolean formula ψ is true. The formula
ψ can be assumed to be in prenex normal form Q1x1Q2x2 . . .Qmxm φ(X) such that the quantifiers are
alternating existential and universal quantifiers (Q1 = ∃, Q2 = ∀, Q3 = ∃, . . .), X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xm} is the
set of quantified variables, and φ(X) =C1∧ . . .∧Cn is an unquantified Boolean formula over X equal to
the conjunction of the clauses C1, . . . ,Cn.
Such a formula ψ is true if there exists a value of x1 such that for all values of x2, there exists a value
of x3 . . ., such that the resulting valuation ν of all variables of X evaluates φ(X) to true. Formally, for
each odd (resp. even) k, 1≤ k≤m, let us denote by fk : {0,1}k−1→{0,1} (resp. gk : {0,1}k−1→{0,1})
a valuation of variable xk given a valuation of previous variables x1, . . . ,xk−16. Given theses sequences
f = f1, f3, . . . and g = g2,g4, . . ., let us denote by ν = ν( f ,g) the valuation of all variables of X such that
ν(x1) = f1, ν(x2) = g2(ν(x1)), ν(x3) = f3(ν(x1)ν(x2)), . . .. Then
ψ = Q1x1Q2x2 . . .Qmxm φ(X) is true
if and only if
there exist f = f1, f3, . . . such that for all g = g2,g4, . . ., the valuation ν f ,g evaluates φ(X) to true.
Proof of Proposition 27. Let us detail a polynomial reduction from the QBF problem to the contraint
problem for Boolean games with Reachability objectives. Let ψ =Q1x1Q2x2 . . .Qmxm φ(X) with φ(X) =
C1 ∧ . . .∧Cn be a fully quantified Boolean formula in prenex normal form. We build the following
Boolean game Gψ = (Π,V,(Vi)i∈Π,E,(Gaini)i∈Π) (see Figure 3):
• the set V of vertices:
– for each variable xk ∈ X under quantifier Qk, there exist vertices xk, ¬xk and qk;
– for each clause Ck, there exist vertices ck and tk;
– there exists an additionnal vertex tn+1;
6Notice that f1 : /0→{0,1}.
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• the set E of edges:
– from each vertex qk there exist an edge to xk and an edge to ¬xk;
– from each vertex xk and ¬xk, there exists an edge to qk+1, except for k = m where this edge
is to c1;
– from each vertex ck, there exist an edge to tk and an edge to ck+1, except for k = n where
there exist an edge to tn and an edge to tn+1;
– there exists a loop on each tk;
• the set Π of n+2 players:
– each player i, 1≤ i≤ n, owns vertex ci;
– player n+ 1 (resp. n+ 2) is the player who owns the vertices qi for each existential (resp.
universal) quantifier Qi;
– as all other vertices have only one outgoing edge, it does not matter which player owns them;
• each function Gaini is associated with the objective of visiting the set Fi defined as follows:
– for all i, 1≤ i≤ n, Fi = {` ∈V | ` is a literal of clause Ci}∪{ti};
– Fn+1 = {tn+1};
– Fn+2 = {t1, . . . , tn}.
q1 q2 q3 . . . qm c1 . . . cn tn+1
x1
¬x1
x2
¬x2
xm
¬xm
t1 tn
Figure 3: Reduction from the formula ψ to the Boolean game Gψ
Remark 28. (1) Notice that a sequence f of functions fk : {0,1}k−1→ {0,1}, with k odd, 1≤ k ≤ m, as
presented above, can be translated into a strategy σn+1 of player n+ 1 in the initialized game (Gψ ,q1),
and conversely. Similarly, a sequence g of functions gk : {0,1}k−1→ {0,1}, with k even, 1 ≤ k ≤ m is
nothing else than a strategy σn+2 of player n+ 2. (2) Notice also that if ρ is a play in (Gψ ,q1), then
Gainn+1(ρ) = 1 if and only if Gainn+2(ρ) = 0. Moreover, suppose that ρ visits tn+1, then for all i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, Gaini(ρ) = 1 if and only if for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ρ visits a vertex that is a litteral of Ci if and
only if there is a valuation of all variables of X that evaluates φ(X) to true.
The game Gψ can be constructed from ψ in polynomial time. Let us now show that ψ is true if and
only if there exists a weak SPE in (Gψ ,q1) with a payoff p≥ (0, . . . ,0,1,0) (that is, such that pn+1 = 1).
(⇒) Suppose that ψ is true. Then there exists a sequence f of functions fk : {0,1}k−1 → {0,1},
with k odd, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, such that for all sequences g of functions gk : {0,1}k−1 → {0,1}, with k even,
1≤ k ≤ m, the valuation ν f ,g evaluates φ(X) to true. We define a strategy profile σ as follows:
• for player n+1, his strategy σn+1 is the strategy corresponding to the sequence f (by Remark 28);
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• for player n+ 2, his strategy is an arbitrary strategy σn+2; we denote by g the corresponding
sequence gk : {0,1}k−1→{0,1}, with k even, 1≤ k ≤ m (by Remark 28);
• for each player i, 1≤ i≤ n,
– if hv ∈ Histi(q1) with v = ci, is consistent with σn+1, then σi(hv) = ci+1 if i 6= n and tn+1
otherwise
– else σi(hv) = ti.
Let us prove that σ is a weak SPE, that is, for each history hv ∈Hist(q1), there is no one-shot deviat-
ing strategy in the subgame (Gψh,v) that is profitable to the player who owns vertex v (by Proposition 7).
This is clearly true for all v = ti, 1≤ i≤ n+1, since ti has only one outgoing edge. For the other vertices
v, we study two cases:
• hv is consistent with σn+1: By hypothesis, the valuation ν f ,g evaluates φ(X) to true, that is, it
evaluates all clauses Ci to true. Hence by Remark 28, the play ρ = h〈σh〉v visits a vertex of Fi for
all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and by definition of σ , ρ eventually loops on tn+1. This means that Gain(ρ) =
(1,1, . . . ,1,0). Notice that as σn+2 is arbitrary, using another strategy σ ′n+2 in place of σn+2 leads
to a play ρ ′ such that Gain(ρ ′) = Gain(ρ). As Gain(ρ) = (1,1, . . . ,1,0), only player n+ 2 has
an incentive to deviate to increase his gain. Nevertheless, as just explained, using another strategy
does not change his gain.
• hv is not consistent with σn+1: Suppose that v = ck. Then by definition of σ , the play h〈σh〉v
eventually loops on tk leading to a gain of 1 for player k. This player has thus no incentive to
deviate with a one-shot deviation in the subgame (Gψh,v).
Suppose that v = qk. Then by definition of σ , the play ρ = h〈σh〉v eventually loops on t1. It
follows that Gainn+1(ρ) = 0 and Gainn+2(ρ) = 1. As we only have to consider one-shot deviating
strategies, if qk ∈Vn+2, player n+2 has no incentive to deviate, and if qk ∈Vn+1, player n+1 could
try to use a one-shot deviating strategy, however the resulting play still eventually loops on t1.
This proves that σ is a weak SPE. Its payoff is equal to p = (1,1, . . . ,1,0) as explained previously.
Therefore it satisfies the constraint p≥ (0, . . . ,0,1,0).
(⇐) Suppose that there exists a weak SPE σ in (Gψ ,q1) with outcome ρ and payoff Gain(ρ) ≥
(0, . . . ,0,1,0), that is, Gainn+1(ρ) = 1. By Remark 28, it follows that Gainn+2(ρ) = 0. We have to prove
that ψ is true. To this end, consider the sequence f of functions fk : {0,1}k−1 → {0,1}, with k odd,
1 ≤ k ≤ m, that corresponds to strategy σn+1 of player n+ 1 by Remark 28. Let us show that for all
sequences g of functions gk : {0,1}k−1 → {0,1}, with k even, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, the valuation ν f ,g evaluates
φ(X) to true.
By contradiction assume that it is not the case for some sequence g′ and consider the related strategy
σ ′n+2 of player n+ 2 by Remark 28. Notice that σ ′n+2 is a finitely deviating strategy. Let us consider
the outcome ρ ′ of the strategy profile (σ ′n+2,σ−(n+2)) from q1. As Gainn+2(ρ) = 0, we must have
Gainn+2(ρ ′) = 0, otherwise σ ′n+2 is a profitable deviation for player n+ 2 whereas σ is a weak SPE.
It follows that Gainn+1(ρ ′) = 1 by Remark 28, that is, ρ ′ eventually loops on tn+1.
Now recall that the valuation ν f ,g′ evaluates φ(X) to false, which means that it evaluates some clause
Ck of φ(X) to false. Consider the history hck < ρ ′. As strategy σ ′n+2 only acts on the left part of the
underlying graph of Gψ , we have ρ ′ = 〈σ ′n+2,σ−(n+2)〉q1 = h〈σh〉ck . In the subgame (Gψh,ck), the
outcome of σh gives a gain of 0 to player k because ρ ′ = h〈σh〉ck does not visit tk and ν f ,g′ evaluates Ck
to false. In this subgame, player k has thus a profitable one-shot deviation that consists to move to tk. It
follows that σ is not a weak SPE which is impossible. Then ψ is true.
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For Boolean games with Safety objectives, we can use the same reduction and the same kind of
arguments as for Reachability objectives.
Proposition 29. The constraint problem for Boolean games with Safety objectives is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. Given a fully quantified Boolean formula ψ , we construct the same game as in the proof of
Proposition 27 (see Figure 3), except that each player i, 1≤ i≤ n+2, aims at avoiding the set F ′i (instead
of visiting the set Fi) defined as follows:
• for all i, 1≤ i≤ n, F ′i = {` ∈V | ` is a literal of clause Ci}∪{tn+1};
• F ′n+1 = {t1, t2, . . . tn};
• F ′n+2 = {tn+1}.
Recall how the sets Fi were defined: Fn+1 = {tn+1}, Fn+2 = {t1, t2, . . . tn}, and for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Fi =
{` ∈ V | ` is a literal of clause Ci}∪{ti}. Hence we have a clear duality for players n+ 1 and n+ 2: a
play ρ visits Fn+1 (resp. Fn+2) if and only if ρ avoids F ′n+1 (resp. F ′n+2). This is not the case for the others
players, but one can check that the proof works in the same way as for Boolean games.
4.2.3 Proof of Corollaries 21 and 24
We conclude Section 4 with the proof of two previous corollaries. We begin with Corollary 24 stating
that the constraint problem for SPEs (instead of weak SPEs) in Boolean games with Reachability and
Safety objectives is PSPACE-complete.
Proof of Corollary 24. As weak SPEs and SPEs are equivalent notions for Reachability objectives (Propo-
sition 9), by Theorem 23, the constraint problem for SPEs for Boolean games with Reachability objec-
tives is PSPACE-complete.
Let us study the case of Safety objectives. The reduction from QBF proposed in the proof of Proposi-
tion 29 uses the game Gψ of Figure 3. Due to the structure of the underlying graph, all weak SPEs of Gψ
are SPEs since any deviating strategy from a given strategy is necessarily finitely deviating. This shows
that the constraint problem for SPEs is PSPACE-hard for Safety objectives. It is proved in [30] that this
problem is in PSPACE.
We now turn to Corollary 21 that states that if there exists a weak SPE in a Boolean game, then there
exists a finite-memory weak SPE with the same payoff such that the strategy memory sizes are polyno-
mial for all objectives, except for Reachability and Safety objectives where the sizes are exponential.
Proof of Corollary 21. For the objectives that are prefix-independent, this is an immediate consequence
of Proposition 19 with strategy sizes in O(|V |3 · |Π|). For Reachability and Safety objectives, we need to
transform the Boolean game with Reachability (resp. Safety) objectives into a Boolean game with Bu¨chi
(resp. Co-Bu¨chi) objectives, as done in the proof of Proposition 25 (resp. Proposition 26). Recall that
the set of vertices of the latter game is equal to V ′ = V × 2|Π|. We can thus again apply Proposition 19
and obtain strategy sizes in O(|V ′|3 · |Π|) = O(|V |3 · |Π| ·23·|Π|).
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5 Fixed parameter tractability
In this section, we show that the constraint problem is P-complete for Explicit Muller objectives, that it
is fixed parameter tractable for the other classical ω-regular objectives, and that it becomes polynomial
when the number of players is fixed.
These results do not rely on the concept of good symbolic witness (as in Section 4) but rather on
the following algorithm based on Theorem 14 to solve the constraint problem. Given a Boolean game
(G ,v0) and thresholds x,y ∈ {0,1}|Π|,
• Compute the initial sets P0(v), v ∈V , and repeat the Remove-Adjust procedure (see Definition 11)
until reaching the fixpoint Pk∗(v), v ∈V ,
• Then check whether Pk∗(v) 6= /0 for all v ∈ Succ∗(v0) and whether there exists a payoff p ∈ Pk∗(v0)
such that x≤ p≤ y.
We call this algorithm the decision algorithm and its first part computing the fixpoint the fixpoint algo-
rithm.
5.1 Complexity of the decision algorithm
We here study the time complexity of the decision algorithm. We express it in terms of three parameters:
• O(init): the complexity of computing P0(v) for some given vertex v,
• m = maxv∈V |P0(v)|: the maximum number of payoffs in the sets P0(v), v ∈V ,
• O(path): the complexity of determining whether there exists a play with a given payoff p from a
given vertex v. (This test is required in both the computation of P0(v) and the Adjust operation.)
Lemma 30. The time complexity of the decision algorithm is in O(m3 · |V | · |Π| · init · path · (|V |+ |E|)).
Expressing the complexity in this way will be useful in Section 5.3 (dedicated to Boolean games with
Explicit Muller objectives and to the fixed parameter tractability of the constraint problem). We do not
claim that the given complexity is the tightest one but this is enough for our purpose.
The gain function Gaini takes its values in {0,1} for all i, hence m is bounded by 2|Π|. Moreover by
definition of P0(v), O(init) is in O(2|Π| · path). For Boolean games with Explicit Muller objectives, we
will provide a polynomial bound for both m and O(init) (see Section 5.3). Next Section 5.2 is devoted
to the study of O(path).
Proof of Lemma 30. We suppose that the graph G is given as |V | lists of successors and the sets Pk(v)
are given as |V | lists of payoffs. The comparison between two payoffs is in O(|Π|) time.
We first study the time complexity of the fixpoint algorithm.
• The first step of the algorithm is to compute the sets P0(v) for all v, that takes O(|V | · init) time.
• Then the algorithm repeats the Remove-Adjust procedure until reaching a fixpoint. There are at
most m · |V | repetitions of this procedure since it removes at least one payoff from some Pk(v).
• The computation of one Remove operation is inO((|V |+|E|)·m2 ·|Π|) time. Indeed we potentially
have to consider all the vertices v and their successors v′ to check whether there exists p ∈ Pk(v)
such that pi < p′i for all p
′ ∈ Pk(v′) (with v ∈ Vi). This takes O((|V |+ |E|) ·m2 · |Π|) time. If the
check is positive, we have to remove p from Pk(v) that takes O(m · |Π|) time.
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• The computation of one Adjust operation is in O((|V |+ |E|) ·m · |Π| · path) time. Indeed if p is
the payoff removed by the Remove operation just before, for all u such that p ∈ Pk(u), we have
to check whether there exists a (p,k)-labeled play with payoff p from u and remove p from Pk(u)
in case of non existence of such a play. This can be done by computing a graph G′ from G by
restricting V to the vertices u such that p ∈ Pk(u) (in O((|V | ·m · |Π|+(|V |+ |E|)) time), and for
each u by checking in G′ whether there exists a play with payoff p from u and then remove p from
Pk(u) in case of non existence (in O(|V | · (path+m · |Π|)) time).
Therefore the total time complexity of the fixpoint algorithm is in O(|V | · init +m · |V | · [(|V |+ |E|) ·
m2 · |Π|+(|V |+ |E|) ·m · |Π| · path]) =O(|V | · init+m3 · |V | · |Π| · path · (|V |+ |E|)). This is bounded by
O(m3 · |V | · |Π| · init · path · (|V |+ |E|)).
To get the time complexity of the decision algorithm, it remains to add the time complexities to test if
Pk∗(v) 6= /0 for all v∈ Succ∗(v0) and if there exists a payoff p∈Pk∗(v0) such that x≤ p≤ y. The first part is
done inO((|V |+ |E|)) time by a depth-first search of G from v0, and the second part is done inO(m · |Π|)
time. The overall complexity of the decision algorithm is thus in O(m3 · |V | · |Π| · init · path · (|V |+ |E|))
time as announced.
5.2 Existence of a play with a given payoff
The purpose of this section is to prove the next lemma stating the complexity O(path) for all kinds of
ω-regular objectives.
Lemma 31. Let G be a Boolean game. Let p ∈ {0,1}|Π| and v ∈V .
1. Determining whether there exists a play with payoff p from v is
• in polynomial time for Bu¨chi, co-Bu¨chi, Explicit Muller, and Parity objectives,
• in O(2|Π|(|V |+ |E|)) time for Reachability and Safety objectives, and
• in O(2L ·M+(LL · |V |)5) time for Rabin, Streett, and Muller objectives, where L = 2` and
– `= Σ|Π|i=12 · ki and M = O(Σ|Π|i=12 · ki) such that for each player i ∈Π, ki is the number of
his pairs (Gij,R
i
j)1≤ j≤ki in the case of Rabin and Streett objectives, and
– ` = Σ|Π|i=1di and M = O(Σ
|Π|
i=1|Fi| ·di) such that for each player i ∈ Π, di (resp. |Fi|), is
the number of his colors (the size of his family of subsets of colors) in the case of Muller
objectives.
2. When the number |Π| of players is fixed, for all these kinds of objectives, the existence of a play
with payoff p from v can be solved in polynomial time.
The general approach to prove this lemma is the following one. A play with payoff p from v in a
Boolean game G is a play satisfying an objective Ω equal to the conjunction of objectives Obji (when
pi = 1) and of objectives Vω \Obji (when pi = 0). It is nothing else than an infinite path in the under-
lying graph G = (V,E) satisfying some particular ω-regular objective Ω. The existence of such paths
is a well studied problem; we gather in the next proposition the known results that we need for proving
Lemma 31. Recall that a Generalized Reachability (resp. Generalized Bu¨chi) objective Ω is a conjunc-
tion of Reachability (resp. Bu¨chi) objectives. Moreover, an objective Ω equal to a Boolean combination
of Bu¨chi objectives, called a BC Bu¨chi objective, is defined as follows. Let F1, . . . , F` be ` subsets of
V , and φ be a Boolean formula over variables f1, . . . , f`. We say that an infinite path ρ in G satisfies
(φ ,F1, . . . , F` ) if the truth assignment
fi = 1 if and only if Inf(ρ)∩Fi 6= /0, and fi = 0 otherwise
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satisfies φ . All operators ∨, ∧, ¬ are allowed in a BC Bu¨chi objective. However we denote by |φ | the
size of φ equal to the number of disjunctions and conjunctions inside φ , and we say that the BC Bu¨chi
objective (φ ,F1, . . . , F` ) is of size |φ | and with ` variables.
Proposition 32. Let G = (V,E) be a graph, v ∈ V be one of its vertices, and Ω ⊆ Vω be an objective.
Then deciding the existence of an infinite path from v in G that satisfies Ω is
• in polynomial time for Ω equal to either a Streett objective Ω, or an Explicit Muller objective, or
the opposite of an Explicit Muller objective, or a conjunction of a Generalized Bu¨chi objective and
a co-Bu¨chi objective,
• in O(2`(|V |+ |E|)) time for Ω equal to a conjunction of a Generalized Reachability objective and
a Safety objective, where ` is the number of reachability objectives,
• in O(2L · |φ |+(LL · |V |)5) time for a BC Bu¨chi objective Ω= (φ ,F1, . . . , F` ), where L = 2`.
Proof. Let Ω be an objective. If it is a Streett objective, then the result is proved in [16].
For the other objectives, we use known results about two-player zero-sum games, where player A
aims at satisfying a certain objective Ω whereas player B tries to prevent him to satisfy it. A classical
problem is to decide whether player A has a winning strategy that allows him to satisfy Ω against any
strategy of player B, see for instance [9, 21]. When player A is the only one to play, the existence of a
winning strategy for him is equivalent to the existence of a path satisfying Ω (see [9, Section 3.1]). This
is exactly the problem that we want to solve. In the sequel of the proof, we mean by (G,Ω) a two-player
zero-sum game, where player A (resp. player B) aims at satisfying Ω (resp. Vω \Ω).
If Ω is an Explicit Muller objective, then deciding the existence of a winning strategy for player A
(resp. player B) (G,Ω) can be done in polynomial time by [23]. Thus the case where Ω is the opposite
of an Explicit Muller objective is also proved (by exchanging players A and B).
Suppose that Ω is the conjunction of a Generalized Bu¨chi objective and a co-Bu¨chi objective. By
a classical reduction, the game (G,Ω) can be polynomially transformed into a game (G′,Ω′) with an
objective Ω′ equal to the conjunction of a Bu¨chi objective and a co-Bu¨chi objective. The existence of a
winning strategy for player A in the latter game can be tested in polynomial time [1].
Suppose that Ω is the conjunction of a Generalized Reachability objective and a Safety objective,
such that ` is the number of Reachability objectives and F is the set of vertices to be avoided in the
Safety objective. We first treat separately the Safety objective by removing from G all the vertices of F .
This can be done in O(|V |+ |E|) time. In the resulting graph G′, we then test the existence of a winning
strategy for player A in the game (G′,Ω′) with Ω′ being the Generalized Reachability objective. This can
be done in O(2`(|V |+ |E|)) time [17].
If Ω is a BC Bu¨chi objective (φ ,F1, . . . , F` ), then deciding the existence of a winning strategy for
player A in the game (G,Ω) can be done in O(2L · |φ |+(LL · |V |)5) time with L = 2` by [10].
Proof of Lemma 31. Let us prove Part 1 of the lemma. A play with payoff p from v in G is a play
satisfying an objective Ω equal to the conjunction of objectives Obji (when pi = 1) and of objectives
Vω \Obji (when pi = 0). For each type of Boolean objectives Obji, we first explain what kind of objective
Ω we obtain and we then apply Proposition 32.
• Consider a Boolean game G with Parity objectives. In this case, as Obji is a Parity objective for all
i ∈ Π, each Vω \Obji is again a Parity objective, and Ω is thus a conjunction of Parity objectives
which is a Streett objective [14]. Therefore the existence of a play with payoff p in G can be tested
in polynomial time by Proposition 32.
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• Consider the case of Bu¨chi objectives. Then, the intersection of Bu¨chi objectives Obji (when
pi = 1) is a Generalized Bu¨chi objective and the intersection of co-Bu¨chi objectives Vω \Obji
(when pi = 0) is again a co-Bu¨chi objective. Hence Ω is the conjunction of a Generalized Bu¨chi
objective and a co-Bu¨chi objective. The existence of a play with payoff p in G can be tested in
polynomial time by Proposition 32.
Notice that the case of Boolean games with co-Bu¨chi objectives is solved exactly in the same way.
Indeed we have the same kind of objective Ω since Obji is a co-Bu¨chi objective if and only if
Vω \Obji is a Bu¨chi objective.
• Consider a Boolean game with Reachability objectives. The intersection of Reachability objectives
Obji (when pi = 1) is a Generalized Reachability objective and the intersection of Safety objectives
Vω \Obji (when pi = 0) is again a Safety objective. The existence of a play with payoff p in G
can be tested in O(2|Π|(|V |+ |E|)) time by Proposition 32 as there are at most |Π| Reachability
objectives.
The case of Boolean games with Safety objectives is solved in the same way.
• Consider a Boolean game with Rabin objectives (with the related families (Gij,Rij)1≤ j≤ki , i ∈ Π).
In this case, the objective Ω is the conjunction of Rabin objectives (when pi = 1) and of Streett
objectives (when pi = 0), that is, Ω is a BC Bu¨chi objective (φ ,(Gij,Rij)1≤ j≤ki , i ∈Π) such that
φ =
∧
i|pi=1
ki∨
j=1
(gij ∧¬rij) ∧
∧
i|pi=0
ki∧
j=1
(¬gij ∨ rij) (12)
In this formula, the variable gij (resp. r
i
j) is associated with the set G
i
j (resp. R
i
j), and φ has size
O(Σ|Π|i=12 · ki) and has Σ|Π|i=12 · ki variables. The announced complexity for deciding the existence of
a play with payoff p follows from Proposition 32.
The case of Boolean games with Streett objectives is solved in the same way.
• The case of Boolean games with Muller objectives (with the related coloring functions Ωi : V →
{1, . . . ,di} and families Fi ⊆ 2Ωi(V ), i ∈ Π) is treated as in the previous item. Indeed a play
satisfies the Muller objective Obji if there exists an element F of Fi such that all colors of F are
seen infinitely often along the play while no other color is seen infinitely often. Therefore, as the
objective Ω is a conjunction of Muller objectives and of the opposite of Muller objectives, Ω is a
BC Bu¨chi objective (φ ,(F ic)c∈{1,...,di},i∈Π) described by the following formula φ
φ =
∧
i|pi=1
∨
F∈Fi
(
∧
c∈F
f ic ∧
∧
c 6∈F
¬ f ic) ∧
∧
i|pi=0
∧
F∈Fi
(
∨
c∈F
¬ f ic ∨
∨
c 6∈F
f ic) (13)
In this formula, the variable f ic is associated with the subset F
i
c = {v ∈ V | Ωi(v) = c} of vertices
colored by color c ∈ {1, . . . ,di}, i ∈ Π. This formula has size O(Σ|Π|i=1|Fi| · di) and has Σ|Π|i=1di
variables.
• It remains to treat the case of Boolean games with Explicit Muller objectives (with the related
familiesFi ⊆ 2V , i ∈Π). The approach is a little different in a way to get a polynomial algorithm.
By definition, there exists a play ρ with payoff p if and only if for all i, F = Inf(ρ) ∈Fi exactly
when pi = 1.
If p 6= (0, . . . ,0), such potential sets F can be computed as follows. Initially let Ω be an empty set.
Then for each F ∈ ∪i∈ΠFi, we compute q ∈ {0,1}|Π| such that qi = 1 if and only if F ∈Fi, and
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if p = q we add F to Ω. Notice that Ω can be computed in polynomial time. Hence to test the
existence of a play with payoff p in G , we test the existence of a path in G satisfying the Explicit
Muller objective Ω. This can be done in polynomial time by Proposition 32.
If p = (0, . . . ,0), there exists a play ρ with payoff p if and only if no F ∈ Ω′ = ∪i∈ΠFi is equal
to Inf(ρ), i.e., if and only if there exists a path in G satisfying the opposite of the Explicit Muller
objective Ω′. This can be tested in polynomial time by Proposition 32.
We now turn to Part 2 of the lemma. Suppose that the number |Π| of players is fixed. In case of
Boolean games with Reachability, Safety, Bu¨chi, co-Bu¨chi, Explicit Muller, and Parity objectives, by
Part 1 of the lemma, we get a polynomial time algorithm for deciding whether there exists a play with
payoff p. In case of Boolean games with Rabin, Streett, and Muller objectives, we need another argument
in view of the complexities of Part 1 of the lemma.
Let us begin with Rabin objectives (the argument is similar for Streett objectives). Recall that we are
faced with a BC Bu¨chi objective described by formula φ given in (12). This formula is a conjunction of
disjunctions of subformulas of the form either gij∧¬rij, or ¬gij, or rij. It can be rewritten as a disjunction
of conjunctions of those subformulas:
∨
r
∧
s φrs. In the latter formula,
• the number of subformulas ∧s φrs is polynomial since it is equal to Πi|pi=1ki ·Πi|pi=02ki, and
• each subformula ∧s φrs describes a polynomial conjunction of Bu¨chi and co-Bu¨chi objectives, that
is, an objective Ωr equal to the conjunction of a Generalized Bu¨chi objective and a co-Bu¨chi
objective.
By Proposition 32, testing whether there exists a path satisfying Ωr can be done in polynomial time.
Therefore testing the existence of a path satisfying the objective described by φ reduces to a polynomial
number of tests (disjunction
∨
r) that can be done in polynomial time (objective Ωr).
The argument for Muller objectives is similar. The formula φ given in (13) is a conjunction of
disjunctions of subformulas of the form either
∧
c∈F f ic ∧
∧
c6∈F ¬ f ic, or ¬ f ic, or f ic. Rewriting φ as a dis-
junction of conjunctions of those subformulas, that is, as
∨
r
∧
s φrs, we get again a polynomial number
(=Πi|pi=1|Fi| ·Πi|pi=0(|Fi| ·di)) of subformulas
∧
s φrs, each of them describing a polynomial conjunc-
tion of Bu¨chi and co-Bu¨chi objectives.
5.3 P-completeness for Explicit Muller objectives and FPT for the other objectives
With the complexity of the decision algorithm given in Lemma 30 and the study of O(path) made in
Lemma 31, we are now ready to show that the constraint problem is P-complete for Explicit Muller
objectives, and that for the other objectives, it is fixed parameter tractable and becomes polynomial when
the number |Π| of players is fixed.
Theorem 33. The constraint problem for multiplayer Boolean games with Explicit Muller objectives is
P-complete.
Proof. We denote by Fi ⊆ 2V , the family of each player i ∈ Π for his Explicit Muller objective. Let
us prove the P-easyness. By Lemma 30, the decision algorithm is in O(m3 · |V | · |Π| · init · path · (|V |+
|E|)) time, where m = maxv∈V |P0(v)|, O(init) is the time complexity of computing P0(v) for some
given vertex v, and O(path) is the time complexity of testing whether there exists a play with a given
payoff p from a given vertex v. Lemma 31 states that O(path) is polynomial for Boolean games with
Explicit Muller objectives. To establish the P-easiness, it remains to prove that O(m) and O(init) are
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also polynomial. First, if there exists a play ρ with payoff p from v, then either Inf(ρ) ∈ ∪i∈ΠFi or
p = (0, . . . ,0). Thus
P0(v)⊆ P = {q ∈ {0,1}|Π| | ∃F ∈ ∪i∈ΠFi,qi = 1⇔ F ∈Fi}∪{(0, . . . ,0)}.
(This kind of argument was already used in the proof of Lemma 31 for Explicit Muller objectives).
Therefore, |P0(v)| ≤ |P| ≤ |∪i∈ΠFi|+1, showing that O(m) is polynomial. Second, to compute P0(v),
we check for each p ∈ P whether there exists a play with payoff p from v. It follows that O(init) is
polynomial by Lemma 31.
The P-hardness is obtained thanks to a reduction from the AND-OR graph reachability problem
that is P-complete [24]. Indeed, the P-hardness of the constraint problem for SPEs (instead of weak
SPEs) in Boolean games with Reachability objectives is proved in [30, Corollary 6.22] thanks to such
a reduction, and it is not difficult to see that the same reduction also holds for weak SPEs and Explicit
Muller objectives.
We recall that a parameterized language L is a subset of Σ∗×N, where Σ is a finite alphabet, the
second component being the parameter of the language. It is called fixed parameter tractable if there is
an algorithm that determines whether (x, t)∈ L in f (t) · |x|c time, where c is a constant independent of the
parameter t and f is a computable function depending on t only. We also say that L belongs to the class
FPT. Intuitively, a language is in FPT if there is an algorithm running in polynomial time with respect to
the input size times some computable function on the parameter. We refer the interested reader to [15]
for more details on parameterized complexity.
Theorem 34. Let G be a Boolean game.
1. The constraint problem is in FPT for Reachability, Safety, Bu¨chi, co-Bu¨chi, Parity, Muller, Rabin,
and Streett objectives. The parameters are
• the number |Π| of players for Reachability, Safety, Bu¨chi, co-Bu¨chi, and Parity objectives,
• the number |Π| of players and the numbers ki, i ∈ Π, of pairs (Gij,Rij)1≤ j≤ki , for Rabin and
Streett objectives, and
• the number |Π| of players, the numbers di, i ∈ Π, of colors and the sizes |Fi|, i ∈ Π, of the
families of subsets of colors for Muller objectives.
2. When the number |Π| of players is fixed, for all these kinds of objectives, the constraint problem
can be solved in polynomial time.
Notice that in this theorem, to obtain fixed parameter tractability for Rabin, Streett, and Muller
objectives, in addition to the number of players, we also have to consider the parameter equal to the size
of the objective description. Nevertheless, when the number of players is fixed, we get polynomial time
complexity for all types of objectives.
Proof of Theorem 34. We again use Lemmas 30 and 31 as in the previous proof. By Lemma 30, the
complexity of the fixpoint algorithm is in O(m3 · |V | · |Π| · init · path · (|V |+ |E|)) time. The complexity
O(path) is studied in Part 1 (resp. in Part 2 when |Π| is fixed) of Lemma 31, and we have m≤ 2|Π| and
O(init) = O(2|Π| · path). Hence we get both parts of Theorem 34 as a consequence of these results.
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6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we have studied the computational complexity of the constraint problem for weak SPEs.
We were able to obtain precise complexities for all the classical classes of ω-regular objectives (see
Table 1), with one exception: we have proved NP-membership for Bu¨chi objectives and failed to prove
NP-hardness. We have also shown that the constraint problem can be solved in polynomial time when
the number of players is fixed. Finally, we have provided some fixed parameter tractable algorithms
when the number of players is considered as a parameter of the problem, for Reachability, Safety, Bu¨chi,
Co-Bu¨chi, and Parity objectives. For the other Rabin, Streett, and Muller objectives, we also had to
consider the size of the objective description as a parameter to obtain fixed parameter tractability. In a
future work, we want to understand if the use of this second parameter is really necessary.
By characterizing the exact complexity of the constraint problem for Reachability and Safety objec-
tives, we have obtained that this problem for SPEs (as for weak SPEs) is PSPACE-complete for those
objectives. In the future, we intend to investigate the complexity of the other classes of ω-regular objec-
tives for SPEs. It would be also interesting to extend the study to quantitative games. For instance the
constraint problem for (weak) SPEs in reachability quantitative games is decidable [8] but its complexity
is unknown.
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